Editorial Type:
Review Article

Impacts of dual-use research on life science researchers including veterinarians

Tanya D. Graham Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences Department, College of Agriculture and Biological Sciences, South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD 57007.

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 DVM, DACVP
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2460/ajvr.74.1.166
Volume/Issue:
Volume 74: Issue 1
Online Publication Date:
01 Jan 2013
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Abstract

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, concern for the future direction of biological research has expanded to include not only issues involving the welfare of mankind, but also the more immediate and personal concern of individual scientists in the life sciences community. For many investigators in the life sciences, the remainder of their careers will be impacted by concerns about bioterrorism and issues associated with dual-use research. Awareness of these issues will be critical for all professional groups and affiliated organizations as they navigate the growing call for more federal rules and regulations. Veterinarians are not immune to the coming changes in science; all researchers risk criminal sanctions if they violate the USA Patriot Act or the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. Compliance with these regulations will be necessary, not just because of the potential legal ramifications, but because establishing and maintaining public trust is a never-ending requirement for the future of scientific research.

Abstract

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, concern for the future direction of biological research has expanded to include not only issues involving the welfare of mankind, but also the more immediate and personal concern of individual scientists in the life sciences community. For many investigators in the life sciences, the remainder of their careers will be impacted by concerns about bioterrorism and issues associated with dual-use research. Awareness of these issues will be critical for all professional groups and affiliated organizations as they navigate the growing call for more federal rules and regulations. Veterinarians are not immune to the coming changes in science; all researchers risk criminal sanctions if they violate the USA Patriot Act or the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. Compliance with these regulations will be necessary, not just because of the potential legal ramifications, but because establishing and maintaining public trust is a never-ending requirement for the future of scientific research.

Contributor Notes

Presented as a poster at the 54th Annual American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, Buffalo, NY, September–October 2011.

The author does not have any financial or personal relationships that could inappropriately influence or bias the content of the paper.

Address correspondence to Dr. Graham (tanya.graham@sdstate.edu).
Cover American Journal of Veterinary Research
American Journal of Veterinary Research
Publication Date:
01 Jan 2013
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